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Abstract—We address online bandit learning of Nash equilibria
in multi-agent convex games. We propose an algorithm whereby
each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at each
joint played action, lacking any information of the functional
form of her cost or other agents’ costs or strategies. In contrast
to past work where convergent algorithms required strong
monotonicity, we prove that the algorithm converges to a Nash
equilibrium under mere monotonicity assumption. The proposed
algorithm extends the applicability of bandit learning in several
games including zero-sum convex games with possibly unbounded
action spaces, mixed extension of finite-action zero-sum games,
as well as convex games with linear coupling constraints.
Index Terms—learning in games, monotone bandit learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a powerful framework to address optimiza-
tion and learning of multiple interacting agents referred to as
players. Such multi-agent problems arise in several application
domains including traffic networks, internet, auctions and ad-
versarial learning. In a multi-agent setting, the notion of Nash
equilibrium captures a desirable solution as it exhibits stability.
Namely, no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from
this solution. Nash equilibrium is also consistent with a notion
referred to as rationality - each player aims to optimize her
own cost function. Given these theoretical justifications for
Nash equilibria, from the viewpoint of learning the question
is whether players can learn their Nash equilibrium strategies
with limited information about the game. In particular, in
several application domains, each player might not know the
functional form of her objective. For example, the travel times
of edges in a traffic network or the market constraints in
an auction are unknown a priori and depend in non-trivial
ways on actions and objectives of other players. However, by
playing the game, a player can have access to the so-called
online bandit information feedback, namely, she can receive
payoff information of her objective (zeroth-order oracle) for
any feasible joint actions taken by all the players. Thus, we
focus on how do players learn Nash equilibria given online
bandit information.
Bandit learning in games has been mainly explored in
finite action settings. It is known that if each player uses
a no-regret algorithm, the time average of the sequence of
played actions converges to a coarse-correlated equilibrium
- a relaxed notion of equilibrium which encompasses Nash
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equilibria as well as possibly non-rationalizable strategies.
The convergence of time-averaged sequence of plays in no-
regret algorithms to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium can
be established for special games such as two-player zero-
sum game. However, the convergence of time-averaged actions
does not imply the actual sequence of plays also converges to
a Nash equilibrium. This issue was recently re-examined in
light of progresses in bandit convex optimization. In particular,
[13] showed that if each player uses a fairly general model
of no-regret algorithm (FTRL) in continuous-time, the actual
sequence of plays may not converge to a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum game and it might
exhibit a non-vanishing cycle1. The work of [2] analyzed this
non-convergence through the lens of Hamiltonian and potential
of a game and proposed convergent algorithms assuming
access to exact first and second order oracles (gradients and
Hessians) of the players’ objectives. More recently, motivated
by the Hamiltonian analogy of zero-sum games, [1] extended
the analysis of [13] to discrete-time setting and showed that
sequential gradient descent can overcome the divergence of
discretized simultaneous gradient descent in these games.
The mixed extension of a finite action game falls into cate-
gory of convex games. In such games, each player’s objective
is convex in her own decision variable for any fixed action of
other players (in mixed extension of finite action games, this
objective is linear in each player’s action). Furthermore, the
strategy sets are convex (simplexes in mixed extension games).
It is known that the Nash equilibria in convex differentiable
games correspond to the solution set of a variational inequality
problem. Hence, one can use algorithms for solving variational
inequalities to compute Nash equilibria. This connection has
been used in two lines of works addressing bandit learning
of Nash equilibria in convex games. The works in [18, 4]
showed that no-regret learning can converge to Nash equilibria
in certain class of convex games. Both works leveraged the
idea of one-point estimation of the gradient of the player’s
cost function using the bandit payoff information. Whereas [4]
performed this gradient estimation by perturbing the played
actions with a point sampled from the uniform distribution
on the unit sphere, motivated by Stoke’s theorem [6, 9], the
approach in [18] formed these gradient estimates using Normal
distribution and smoothing motivated by [20, 14]. In both
cases, the convergence was proven by appropriately choosing
the stepsizes to tradeoff the bias and variance of the resulting
estimation terms in the stochastic approximation procedure.
1The FTRL algorithms explored had access to more than bandit feedback
as each player could observe the gradient of its mixed extension cost function
at each time step.
2The above works on learning Nash equilibria rely on strict
monotonicity of the game mapping. The game mapping is
the stacked vector of gradient of each player’s objective with
respect to her actions. In case the game is potential, the
game mapping is symmetric and thus, the game mapping
corresponds to gradient of a single function, the so-called
potential function of the game. Hence, finding equilibria can be
cast as a single-objective optimization and bandit algorithms
can be readily applied to learn Nash equilibria. However, in
general noncooperative games, this game mapping need not be
symmetric. In such cases, a necessary and sufficient condition
for convergence of no-regret algorithms such as those explored
in [18, 4, 13] is strict monotonicity of the game mapping.
The strict monotonicity of the game mapping is a stringent
condition. The non-convergence issue and in particular cyclic
behavior discussed in [13, 2, 1] is due to the fact that the game
mapping in several games do not satisfy strict monotonicity.
Zero-sum games for example are only monotone. This class
of games have been widely adopted in robust optimization and
control, in models of perfect competition and more recently in
adversarial training and deep learning. In addition to zero-sum
games, generalized Nash equilibria problems, that is, Nash
equilibria with coupling constraints can at best have monotone
extended game mappings due to the coupling constraints. The
generalized Nash equilibria problems arise in several domains
where a resource must be shared between agents and this
can only be formulated as a hard rather than soft constraints
[5]. The relevance of games with merely monotone mapping,
motivate our paper on learning Nash equilibria under bandit
feedback in this game class.
Given the connection of Nash equilibria of convex games
with solution set of variational inequality (VI) problem, a
natural starting point for learning Nash equilibria of merely
monotone games is to search for algorithms for solving
the corresponding VIs. This topic is well-explored in [16,
Chapter 12] and several approaches including extra-gradient
and Tikhonov regularization for finding solution of merely
monotone or pseudo-monotone VIs are proposed. All the pro-
posed approaches though require at least first-order (gradient)
feedback. The challenge with generalizing these approaches to
zeroth-order (bandit) feedback is that they require coordination
among the players and are not suitable in the bandit feedback
setting because a player cannot sample her objective functions
at different points while ensuring actions of other players re-
mains fixed. For example, the extra-gradient algorithm in [12]
remedies the cyclic behavior of trajectories in monotone game.
However, it is only applicable to exact first-order feedback
oracle. On the other hand, standard Tikhonov regularization
requires a double iterative procedure, where the players would
solve a regularized VI corresponding to a regularized game
mapping in each inner iteration. Here, solving the inner VI
itself would require an iterative algorithm and it is not clear
how the players should coordinate stopping time for the inner
algorithm in addition to setting the regularization parameter.
Motivated by generalizing the algorithms for learning Nash
equilibria, in our recent work [19] we proposed an approach
to learn Nash equilibria in merely monotone games. Our ap-
proach was inspired by the single timescale Tikhonov regular-
ization algorithm for solving stochastic variational inequalities
[11]. In contrast to the above work that assumed access to
noisy gradients, we considered the single-point estimation of
gradients using the bandit feedback. The main contribution
was to appropriately control the bias and variance introduced
in the single-point estimation along with the Tikhonov reg-
ularization parameter to ensure convergence. Our proposed
algorithm was not applicable to online learning because the
played actions were not bound to lie in the feasible set. Our
current paper fills this gap by providing a convergent algorithm
while ensuring the query points do lie in the feasible set.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows. We develop,
to our best knowledge, the first bandit approach for online
learning Nash equilibria in convex games with merely mono-
tone game mappings. In doing so, we propose a novel single
time-scale double-regularization - this double regularization
corresponds to both the Tikhonov regularization and at the
same time the projection of the actions onto a shrunk feasible
set. By properly managing the interplay between the choice
of the regularization sequence, the radius of shrinkage for
the feasible set and the stepsize we ensure that bias and
variance of the resulting stochastic approximation vanish with
appropriate rates. The choice of parameters are stated in
Assumption 6, whereas the main convergence result is stated
in our Theorem 2. In terms of the proof techniques, there
are few main novelties leading to this theorem: first, showing
that the doubly regularized Tikhonov sequence and a single-
time scale approach to solve it, remain bounded and converges
to the least-norm solution of the variational inequality (see
Theorem 3 and Proposition 1, respectively); second, showing
that iterates of our algorithm remain bounded (see Lemma
5). These results enable us to use well-established results on
boundedness and convergence of stochastic processes to our
setup. In summary, we prove convergence in probability of the
sequence of actions to a Nash equilibria in monotone games.
Notations. The set {1, . . . , N} is denoted by [N ]. Bold-
face is used to distinguish between vectors in a multi-
dimensional space and scalars. Given N vectors xi ∈ Rd,
i ∈ [N ], (xi)Ni=1 := (x1⊤, . . . ,xN
⊤
)⊤ ∈ RNd; x−i :=
(x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xN ) ∈ R(N−1)d. Rd+ and Z+ de-
note, respectively, vectors from Rd with non-negative co-
ordinates and non-negative whole numbers. The standard
inner product on Rd is denoted by (·, ·): Rd × Rd → R,
with associated norm ‖x‖ :=
√
(x,x). Given some matrix
A ∈ Rd×d, A  (≻)0, if and only if x⊤Ax ≥ (>)0 for
all x 6= 0. We use the big-O notation, that is, the function
f(x) : R → R is O(g(x)) as x → a, f(x) = O(g(x)) as
x → a, if limx→a |f(x)||g(x)| ≤ K for some positive constant K .
And with a slight abuse of notation, we write f(x) ≤ O(g(x))
as we estimate certain bounds. We say that a function f(x)
grows not faster than a function g(x) as x → ∞, if there
exists a positive constant Q such that f(x) ≤ g(x) ∀x with
‖x‖ ≥ Q. For x ∈ Rn and convex closed set C ⊂ Rn, ProjCx
denotes the projection of x onto C.
Definition 1: A mapping M : Rd → Rd is monotone over
X ⊆ Rd, if (M (x)−M(y),x−y) ≥ 0 for every x,y ∈ X .
3II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a game Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji}) with N players, the sets
of players’ actions Ai ⊆ Rd, i ∈ [N ], and the cost (objective)
functions Ji : A→ R, where A = A1× . . .×AN denotes the
set of joint actions. We restrict the class of games as follows.
Assumption 1: The game under consideration is convex.
Namely, for all i ∈ [N ] the set Ai is convex and closed,
the cost function Ji(a
i,a−i) is defined on RNd, continuously
differentiable in a and convex in ai for fixed a−i.
Assumption 2: The mapping M : RNd → RNd, referred to
as the game mapping, defined by
M(a) = (∇aiJi(ai,a−i))Ni=1 = (M1(a), . . . ,MN (a))⊤,
where M i(a) = (Mi,1(a), . . . ,Mi,d(a))
⊤, and
Mi,k(a) =
∂Ji(a)
∂aik
, a ∈ A, i ∈ [N ], k ∈ [d], (1)
is monotone on A (see Definition 1).
We consider a Nash equilibrium in game Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji})
as a stable solution outcome because it represents a joint action
from which no player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate.
Definition 2: A point a∗ ∈ A is called a Nash equilibrium
if for any i ∈ [N ] and ai ∈ Ai
Ji(a
i∗,a−i∗) ≤ Ji(ai,a−i∗).
Our goal is to learn such a stable action in a game through
designing a payoff-based algorithm. To do so, we first con-
nect existence of Nash equilibria for Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji}) with
solution set of a corresponding variational inequality problem.
Definition 3: Consider a mapping T (·): Rd → Rd and a
set Y ⊆ Rd. The solution set SOL(Y,T ) to the variational
inequality problem V I(Y,T ) is the set of vectors y∗ ∈ Y
such that (T (y∗),y − y∗) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Y .
Theorem 1: ([16, Proposition 1.4.2]) Given a game
Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji}) with game mapping M , suppose that the
action sets {Ai} are closed and convex, the cost functions {Ji}
are continuously differentiable in a and convex in ai for every
fixed a−i on the interior of A. Then, some vector a∗ ∈ A is
a Nash equilibrium in Γ, if and only if a∗ ∈ SOL(A,M).
It follows that under Assumptions 1 and 2 for a game with
mappingM , any solution of V I(A,M ) is also a Nash equi-
librium in such games and vice versa. While Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji})
under Assumptions 1 and 2 might admit a Nash equilibrium,
these two assumptions alone do not guarantee uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium. More restrictive assumptions for uniqueness
are needed, for example, strong monotonicity of the game
mapping or compactness of the action sets [16]. Here, we
do not restrict our attention to such cases. However, to have
a meaningful discussion, we do assume existence of at least
one Nash equilibrium in the game.
Assumption 3: The set SOL(A,M) is not empty.
Corollary 1: Let Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji}) be a game with game
mapping M for which Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then,
there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in Γ. Moreover, any
Nash equilibrium in Γ belongs to the set SOL(A,M).
The following additional assumptions are needed for con-
vergence of the proposed payoff-based algorithm to a Nash
equilibrium (see proofs of Lemma 5 and Theorem 2).
Assumption 4: Each element M i of the game mapping
M : RNd → RNd, defined in Assumption (2) is Lipschitz
continuous on Rd with a Lipschitz constant Li.
Assumption 5: Each cost function Ji(a), i ∈ [N ] grows at
most polynomially in a as ‖a‖ → ∞. Moreover, in the case of
unbounded joint action set A, each continuous cost function
Ji(a), i ∈ [N ] grows at most linearly in a as ‖a‖ → ∞.
Remark 1: Note that if the set A is unbounded, Assump-
tion 5 is equivalent to each cost function Ji(a), i ∈ [N ], being
Lipschitz continuous on RNd with some constant li Thus, in
both bounded and unbounded A, we denote l = maxi∈[N ] li
as the uniform upper bound of the mapping M over A.
For the development and analysis of our algorithms, we use
the following well-established and easy to verify result.
Lemma 1: Consider a mapping T (·) : Rd → Rd and a
convex closed set Y ⊆ Rd. Given θ > 0,
y∗ ∈ SOL(Y,T ) ⇐⇒ y∗ = ProjY (y∗ − θT (y∗)). (2)
III. PAYOFF-BASED ALGORITHM
Given online payoff-based information, also referred to as
online bandit or zeroth-order oracle information, each agent
has access to its current action, referred to as its state and
denoted by xi(t) = (xi1(t), . . . , x
i
d(t))
⊤ ∈ Rd, and plays the
action ai(t) = ProjAi(x
i(t)) at iteration t. After that the cost
value Jˆi(t) at the joint action a(t) = (a
1(t), . . . ,aN (t)) ∈ A,
Jˆi(t) = Ji(a(t)) is revealed to each agent i. Given these
pieces of information, in the proposed algorithm each agent i
“mixes” its next state xi(t+ 1). Namely, it chooses xi(t+1)
randomly according to the multidimensional normal distribu-
tion N(µi(t+1) = (µi1(t+1), . . . , µ
i
d(t+1))
⊤, σ(t+1)) with
the following density function:
pi(x
i;µi(t+ 1), σt+1) = pi(x
i
1, . . . , x
i
d;µ
i(t+ 1), σt+1)
=
1
(
√
2πσt+1)d
exp
{
−
d∑
k=1
(xik − µik(t+ 1))2
2σ2t+1
}
.
The initial value of the means µi(0), i ∈ [N ], can be set to
any finite value. The successive means are updated as follows:
µi(t+ 1) = Proj(1−rt)Ai
[
µi(t)
− γtσ2t
(
Jˆi(t)
xi(t)− µi(t)
σ2t
+ ǫtµ
i(t)
) ]
. (3)
In the above, (1− rt)Ai = {x ∈ Ai : dist(x, ∂Ai) ≥ rt} and
0 < rt < 1, is a time-dependent shrinkage parameter, γt is the
stepsize parameter and ǫt > 0 is a regularization parameter.
The convergence of the algorithm is dependent on the interplay
of these parameters and the variance term σt > 0.
The difference between the proposed approach and that of
[18] is due to the additional term ǫt in (3). In the absence
of this term the algorithm would converge only if the game
mapping is strictly monotone (see [18, Theorem 2] and coun-
terexamples in [7, 13]). Moreover, in distinction from [19], in
the bandit online feedback considered here, players can only
evaluate their costs over their feasible action set Ai and not
over the whole RNd, necessitating the additional projection
term ai(t) = ProjAi(x
i(t)) and the shrinkage radius rt. As
such, the previous convergence analysis does not apply.
4Before stating the convergence result, let us provide insight
into the procedure defined by Equation (3) by deriving an
analogy to a regularized stochastic gradient algorithm.
Let p(x;µ, σ) =
∏N
i=1 pi(x
i
1, . . . , x
i
d;µ
i, σ) denote the
density function of the joint distribution of agents’ states.
Given σ > 0, for any i ∈ [N ] define J˜i : RNd → R as
J˜i(µ
1, . . . ,µN , σ) =
∫
RNd
Ji(x)p(x;µ, σ)dx. (4)
Thus, J˜i, i ∈ [N ] is the ith player’s cost function in mixed
strategies. Let µ(t) = (µ1(t), . . . ,µN (t)) and for i ∈ [N ],
define M˜ i(·) = (M˜i,1(·), . . . , M˜i,d(·))⊤ as the d-dimensional
mapping with the following elements:
M˜i,k(µ, σ) =
∂J˜i(µ, σ)
∂µik
, for k ∈ [d]. (5)
Our first lemma below shows that the second term inside
the projection in (3) is a sample of the gradient of agent i’s
cost function in mixed strategies.
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions 1 and 5
M˜i,k(µ(t), σt) = E{Ji(x1(t), . . . ,xN (t))x
i
k(t)− µik(t)
σ2t
|
xik(t) ∼ N(µik(t), σt), i ∈ [N ], k ∈ [d]}. (6)
Moreover, M˜i,k(µ, σ) is bounded for any µ ∈ A.
The proof of this Lemma is very similar to that of [19] and
is provided in Appendix B.
The lemma above implies that had we used the term
Ji(x
1(t), . . . ,xN (t))
xi
k
(t)−µi
k
(t)
σ2
t
in (3) we could perform a
one-point estimation of the gradient of the cost functions
in mixed strategies. In the bandit setting considered here,
however, we use the term Ji(a
1(t), . . . ,aN (t))
xi
k
(t)−µi
k
(t)
σ2
t
.
Despite this difference, in the analysis (see (22), (23)) we
show that the difference between these two terms converges
to zero due to the shrinkage radius selection. Thus, algorithm
(3) can be interpreted as a doubly regularized (due to rr and
ǫt) stochastic projection algorithms.
Following the above interpretation, our main result is The-
orem 2 below where we show that by appropriately choosing
the algorithm parameters, we can bound the bias and variance
terms of the stochastic projection and consequently establish
convergence of the iterates µ(t) in (3) to a Nash equilibrium.
Assumption 6: Let βt = γtσ
2
t and choose γt =
1
ta , σt =
1
tb
,
ǫt =
1
tc and rt =
1
td
a, b, c, d > 0 respectively, such that
i)
∑∞
t=0 βt =∞,
∑∞
t=0 βtǫt =∞,
ii)
∑∞
t=0
(ǫt−ǫt−1)
2
βtǫ3t
+ (rt−rt−1)
2
βtǫ6t
<∞,
iii)
∑∞
t=0 γ
2
t <∞,
∑∞
t=0 βtσt <∞,
iv) limt→∞
rt
σt
=∞, limt→∞ rtǫt = 0.
As an example for existence of parameters to satisfy As-
sumption 6, let a1 =
5
9 , a2 =
5
27 , a3 =
1
54 , a4 =
1
6 .
Theorem 2: Let the players in game Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji})
choose the states {xi(t)} at time t according to the normal
distribution N(µi(t), σt), where the mean µ
i(0) is arbitrary
and µi(t) is updated as in (3). Under Assumptions 1-6, as
t → ∞, the mean vector µ(t) converges almost surely to a
Nash equilibrium µ∗ = a∗ of the game Γ and the joint action
a(t) converges in probability to a∗.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ALGORITHM
To prove Theorem 2 we need to first establish boundedness
of the iterates µ(t) for the cases in which the action space is
unbounded. Having established the boundedness, we can show
that the limit of the iterates µ(t) exists and is the minimum
norm Nash equilibrium of the problem. This convergence is
proven using existing results on convergence of a sequence of
random variables (Lemma 10 on page 49 in [17]). For ease
of reference, we provide the supporting statements used for
boundedness [15, Theorem 2.5.2] and for convergence [17,
Lemma 10 on page 49] of the iterates in Appendix A.
A. Characterizing the terms in the algorithm
We first show that algorithm (3) can be interpreted within
the framework of well-studied Robbins-Monro stochastic ap-
proximations procedures [3], where the iterates are updated
according to stochastic gradient descent. In our case, bias
of the game mapping arises due to each player’s one-point
estimation of its gradient. However, in contrast to a stochastic
approximation procedure, the game mapping is in general not
gradient of a single function (as its derivative is not symmetric)
unless the game is potential. Furthermore, there are additional
terms in the algorithm iterates due to the projection of the
query points onto the shrunk feasible set and the regularization
required to handle the non-strictly monotone game mapping.
Let us specify all these terms below.
Using the notationM i(·) = (Mi,1(·), . . . ,Mi,d(·)), we can
rewrite the algorithm step in (3) in the following form:
µi(t+ 1) = Proj(1−rt)Ai [µ
i(t)− γtσ2t
× (M i(µ(t)) +Qi(µ(t), σt) +Ri(x(t),µ(t), σt)
+ P i(x(t),µ(t), σt) + ǫt)µ
i(t)
)
], (7)
for all i ∈ [N ], where Qi, Ri, P i are
Qi(µ(t), σt) = M˜ i(µ(t), σt)−M i(µ(t)),
Ri(x(t),µ(t), σt) = F i(x(t),µ(t), σt)− M˜ i(µ(t), σt),
F i(x(t),µ(t), σt) = Ji(x(t))
xi(t)− µi(t)
σ2t
,
P i(x(t),µ(t), σt) =
xi(t)− µi(t)
σ2t
(Ji(a(t))− Ji(x(t))).
Above, M(µ(t)) = (M1(µ(t)), . . . ,MN (µ(t))) corre-
sponds to the gradient term in stochastic approximation proce-
dures. The mapping M˜ i(µ(t)) evaluated at µ(t) is equivalent
to the game mapping in mixed strategies [19]. That is,
M˜ i(µ(t)) =
∫
RNd
M i(x)p(x;µ(t), σt)dx. (8)
Thus, the Q(µ(t), σt) = (Q1(µ(t), σt), . . . ,QN (µ(t), σt))
can be interpreted as disturbance of the gradient. Furthermore,
according to (6), we have2
Ri(x(t),µ(t), σt) = F i(x(t),µ(t), σt) (9)
− Ex(t){F i(x(t),µ(t), σt)}, i ∈ [N ].
2The notation E
x(t){·} further is used to emphasize that the expectation
is taken in respect to x(t) which has the normal distribution with the mean
µ(t) and the covariance matrix σ(t)I , where I is the identity matrix.
5Thus, R below is a martingale difference
R(x(t),µ(t), σt) = (R1(x(t),µ(t), σt), . . . ,
RN (x(t),µ(t), σt)).
Finally, due to the projection of query points, the term
P (x(t),µ(t), σt) = (P 1(x(t),µ(t), σt), . . . ,
PN (x(t),µ(t), σt)),
is the vector of the difference between the gradient estimation
based on the state x(t) ∈ RNd and the played action a(t) ∈ A.
Our goal is to bound each of the terms above to ensure
convergence and boundedness of the iterates. However, first,
we need to account for the regularization terms ǫt, rt.
B. Analyzing the modified Tikhonov sequence
In contrast to stochastic approximation algorithms and the
proof in [18], we have an addition term ǫtµ(t) to be able
to address merely monotone game mappings. As such, to
bound µ(t) we also relate the variations of the sequence µ(t)
to those of the modified Tikhonov sequence defined below.
Let y(t) = (y1(t), . . . ,yN (t)) denote the solution of the
variational inequality V I((1 − rt)A,M(y) + ǫty), namely
y(t) ∈ SOL((1− rt)A,M(y) + ǫty). (10)
The Tikhonov sequence corresponds to the solution of the
variational inequality above with the rt = 0. Thus, the
sequence {y(t)} can be considered the modified Tikhonov
sequence. Similar to the Tikhonov sequence, y(t) enjoys the
following important property.
Theorem 3: Under Assumptions 2, 3, and 4, y(t) defined in
(10) exists and is unique for each t. Moreover, for ǫt ↓ 0 and
rt → 0 and given limt→∞ rtǫt = 0, y(t) is uniformly bounded
and converges to the least norm solution of V I(A,M ).
The significance of the above theorem is that if we can
establish µ(t) converges to y(t), then from 1 we can establish
convergence to a Nash equilibrium for the game. To prove The-
orem 3, first we establish some useful properties of projecting
onto sets (1 − rt)A, t = 1, 2, . . ..
Lemma 3: For any x ∈ RNd the following holds:
‖Proj(1−rt−1)Ax− Proj(1−rt)Ax‖ = O(|rt−1 − rt|).
Please see the Appendix C for the proof of above Lemma.
Proof: (of Theorem 3) Let a be the least norm solution
of V I(A,M). Moreover, let ap be the projection of a onto
the set (1 − rt)A. Next, let y(t) be the unique solution of
the doubly regularized inequality, namely y(t) ∈ SOL((1 −
rt)A,M + ǫtI). Thus, we conclude that
(M(a),y(t)− a) ≥ 0,
(M (y(t)) + ǫty(t),a
p − y(t)) ≥ 0.
Thus, taking into account monotonicity of M , we obtain
0 ≤(M (a),y(t)− a)
+ (M(y(t)) + ǫty(t),a− y(t))
+ (M(y(t)) + ǫty(t),a
p − a)
=− (M (a)−M(y(t)),a − y(t)) + ǫt(y(t),a− y(t))
+ (M (y(t)) + ǫty(t),a
p − a)
≤ǫt(y(t),a)− ǫt‖y(t)‖2
+ (M (y(t)),ap − a) + ǫt(y(t),ap − a).
Hence,
ǫt‖y(t)‖2 ≤ ǫt(y(t),a) + (M (y(t)),ap − a)
+ ǫt(y(t),a
p − a)
≤ ǫt‖y(t)‖‖a‖+ l‖ap − a‖+ ǫt‖y(t)‖‖ap − a‖
= ǫt‖y(t)‖‖a‖+ lO(rt) + ǫt‖y(t)‖O(rt),
where in the first inequality we used Remark 1 and in the
second one we applied Lemma 3. Hence,
‖y(t)‖2 ≤ ‖y(t)‖‖a‖+ lO
(
rt
ǫt
)
+ ‖y(t)‖O(rt).
By taking the upper limit t→∞ in the inequality above and
due to the settings for ǫt and rt, we obtain
limt→∞[‖y(t)‖2] ≤‖a‖limt→∞‖y(t)‖
+ limt→∞‖y(t)‖limt→∞O(rt).
It implies that limt→∞‖y(t)‖ ≤ ‖a‖, and, thus, the sequence
‖y(t)‖ is upper bounded. Moreover, any accumulation point
of this sequence is bounded above by the Euclidean norm
of the least-norm solution of V I(A,M). Hence, according
to the fact that the function Proj(1−r)A(x) is continuous in
both r and x, y(t) converges to the least norm solution of
V I(A,M).
Since our goal now is to relate µ(t) to y(t), aligned with
procedure (3), we will now design a one-time scale approach
to solving (10) as per (11) below:
z(t+ 1) = Proj(1−rt)A[z(t) − βt(M (z(t)) + ǫtz(t))], (11)
where βt is defined in Assumption 6. We show that the
procedure above is a one time-scale algorithm and similarly
to y(t), it converges to the least norm solution of V I(A,M).
Proposition 1: The sequence z(t) defined by (11) converges
to the least norm solution of V I(A,M).
To prove the result above, we bound ‖z(t + 1) − y(t)‖
in terms of the previous terms in the sequence, namely,
‖z(t)−y(t− 1)‖ and show that [17, Lemma 10, page 49] on
convergence of a random sequence applies. To do so though,
first we need to bound the variations of y(t) as below.
Lemma 4: Under Assumptions 2, 4, and 6, the Tikhonov
sequence y(t) defined in (10) satisfies
‖y(t)− y(t− 1)‖2 =
O
(
(ǫt − ǫt−1)2
ǫ2t
+
(rt − rt−1)2
ǫ5t
)
.
Please see Appendix D for the proof.
In summary, the results of this section enabled us to prove
Proposition 1. This proposition serves as the main new result in
comparison to non-regularized stochastic gradient procedures
in order to show almost-sure boundedness of ‖µ(t)‖ and the
convergence of the algorithm to a Nash equilibrium.
6C. Boundedness of the iterates
Lemma 5: Let Assumptions 2-6 hold in Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji})
and µ(t) be the vector updated in the run of the payoff-based
algorithm (3). Then, Pr{supt≥0 ‖µ(t)‖ <∞} = 1.
Proof: If the set A is compact, then, according to the
updated in (7), the norm of the vector µt is bounded for all
t. So, let us consider the case of the unbounded A.
Define V (t,µ) = ‖µ− z(t)‖2, where z(t) is given in (10).
Consider the generating operator of the Markov process µ(t)
LV (t,µ) = E[V (t+ 1,µ(t+ 1)) | µ(t) = µ]− V (t,µ).
We aim to show that LV (t,µ) satisfies the following decay
LV (t,µ) ≤ −α(t+ 1)ψ(µ) + φ(t)(1 + V (t,µ)), (12)
where ψ, φ and α are terms arising from Q, R and P in
(7). Our goal is to show that ψ ≥ 0 on RNd, φ(t) > 0,
∀t, ∑∞t=0 φ(t) < ∞, α(t) > 0, ∑∞t=0 α(t) = ∞. This
combined with the boundedness of the iterates z(t) stated in
Proposition 1 enable us to apply Theorem 2.5.2 in [15] to
conclude almost sure boundedness of µ(t).
From now on, for simplicity in notation, we omit the
argument σt in the terms M˜ , Q, andR. In certain derivations,
for the same reason we omit the time parameter t as well.
Let us analyze each term i = 1, . . . , N in
V (t+ 1,µ(t+ 1)) =
N∑
i=1
‖µi(t+ 1)− zi(t+ 1)‖2.
From the procedures for the update of µ(t) and z(t) and the
non-expansion property of the projection operator, we obtain
‖µi(t+ 1)− zi(t+ 1)‖2
≤ ‖µi(t)− zi(t)− βt
[
ǫt(µ
i(t)− zi(t))
+ (M i(µ(t))−M i(z(t)) +Qi(µ(t)) +Ri(x(t),µ(t))
+ P i(x(t),µ(t))
]‖2
= ‖µi(t)− zi(t)‖2
− 2βt(M i(µ(t))−M i(z(t)),µi(t)− zi(t))
− 2βtǫt(µi(t)− zi(t),µi(t)− zi(t))
− 2βt(Qi(µ(t)) +Ri(x(t),µ(t)),µi(t)− zi(t))
− 2βt(P i(x(t),µ(t)),µi(t)− zi(t))
+ β2t ‖Gi(x(t),µ(t))‖2, (13)
where, for ease of notation, we have defined
Gi(x(t),µ(t)) =ǫt(µ
i(t)− zi(t))
+M i(µ(t))−M i(z(t))
+Qi(µ(t)) +Ri(x(t),µ(t))
+ P i(x(t),µ(t)). (14)
Note that the terms in ‖Gi(x(t),µ(t))‖2 are given as
‖Gi(x(t),µ(t))‖2 = ǫ2(t)‖µi(t)− zi(t)‖2
+ ‖M i(µ(t)) −M i(z(t))‖2
+ ‖Qi(µ(t))‖2 + ‖Ri(x(t),µ(t))‖2 + ‖P i(x(t),µ(t))‖2
+ 2(Qi(µ(t)),Ri(x(t),µ(t)))
+ 2(P i(x(t),µ(t)),Ri(x(t),µ(t)))
+ 2(Qi(µ(t)),P i(x(t),µ(t)))
+ 2ǫt(M i(µ(t)) −M i(z(t)),µi(t)− zi(t))
+ 2(ǫt(µ
i(t)− zi(t)) +M i(µ(t)) −M i(z(t)),
Qi(µ(t)) +Ri(x(t),µ(t)) + P i(x(t),µ(t))), (15)
Thus, accounting for the above, for (9), which implies
E{‖Ri(x(t),µ(t))‖|µ(t) = µ} = 0 for any µ, and for the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we get from (13)
E{‖µi(t+ 1)− zi(t+ 1)‖2|µ(t) = µ}
≤ (1− 2βtǫt)‖µi − zi(t)‖2
− 2βt(M i(µ)−M i(z(t)),µi − zi(t))
− 2βt(Qi(µ),µi − zi(t))
+ 2βtE{‖P i(x(t),µ(t))‖|µ(t) = µ}‖µi − zi(t)‖
+ β2t E{‖Gi(x(t),µ(t))‖2|µ(t) = µ}
≤ (1− 2βtǫt)‖µi − zi(t)‖2
− 2βt(M i(µ)−M i(z(t)),µi − zi(t))
+ 2βt‖Qi(µ)‖‖µi − zi(t))‖
+ 2βtE{‖P i(x(t),µ(t))‖|µ(t) = µ}‖µi − zi(t)‖
+β2t ǫ
2(t)‖µi − zi(t)‖2
+ β2t [‖M i(µ)−M i(z(t))‖2
+ ‖Qi(µ)‖2
+ E{‖Ri(x(t),µ(t))‖2 + ‖P i(x(t),µ(t))‖2|µ(t) = µ}
+ 2E{(P i(x(t),µ(t)),Ri(x(t),µ(t)))|µ(t) = µ}
+ 2‖Qi(µ)‖E{‖P i(x(t),µ(t)))‖|µ(t) = µ}
+ 2(ǫt‖µi − zi(t)‖ + ‖M i(µ)−M i(z(t))‖)
× (‖Qi(µ)‖+ E{‖P i(x(t),µ(t))‖|µ(t) = µ})]. (16)
We proceed estimating the terms in the inequality above. Due
to Assumption 4, we conclude that
‖M i(µ)−M i(z(t))‖2 ≤ L2i ‖µ− z(t)‖2 = O(V (t,µ))
(M i(µ)−M i(z(t)),µi − zi(t))
≤ ‖M i(µ)−M i(z(t))‖‖µi − zi(t)‖
≤ Li‖µ− z(t)‖‖µi − zi(t)‖ = O(V (t,µ)).
(17)
Let us analyze the terms containing the disturbance of gra-
dient, namely Qi, in Equation (15). Since Qi(µ(t)) =
M˜ i(µ(t)) −M i(µ(t)), due to Assumption 2 and Equation
(8), we obtain
‖Qi(µ)‖ = ‖
∫
RNd
[M i(x)−M i(µ)]p(x;µ, σt)dx‖
≤
∫
RNd
‖M i(x)−M i(µ)‖p(x;µ, σt)dx
≤
∫
RNd
Li‖x− µ‖p(x;µ, σt)dx
≤
∫
RNd
Li
(
N∑
i=1
d∑
k=1
|xik − µik|
)
p(x;µ, σt)dx
= O(σt), (18)
where the last equality is due to the fact that the first
central absolute moment of a random variable with a normal
7distribution N(µ, σ) is O(σ). The estimation above imply, in
particular, that for any µ ∈ A
‖Qi(µ)‖‖µi − zi(t)‖ = O(σt)(1 + V (t,µ)) (19)
‖Qi(µ)‖‖Mi(µ)−Mi(z(t))‖ ≤ Li‖Qi(µ)‖‖µ− z(t)‖
= O(σt)(1 + V (t,µ)). (20)
We bound the martingale term ‖Ri(x(t),µ(t))‖2.
E{‖Ri(x(t),µ(t))‖2|µ(t) = µ}
≤
d∑
k=1
∫
RNd
Ji
2(x)
(xik − µik)2
σ4(t)
p(µ,x)dx
≤ fi(µ, σt)
σ4(t)
=
O(1 + V (t,µ))
σ4(t)
, (21)
where the first inequality is due to the fact that E(ξ−Eξ)2 ≤
Eξ2 and taking into account (9), the second inequality is due
to Assumption 5, with fi(µ, σt) being a quadratic function of
µ and σt, i ∈ [N ] (see Appendix E for more details).
We proceed estimating the terms containing Pt(xt,µ). For
any µ ∈ A we have
E{‖P i(x(t),µ(t))‖2|µ(t) = µ}
= E
‖xi(t)− µi‖2|Ji(x(t)) − Ji(a(t))|2
σ4t
= Pr{x(t) ∈ RNd \A}E‖x
i(t)− µi‖2|Ji(x(t)) − Ji(a(t))|2
σ4t
≤ Pr{x(t) ∈ RNd \A}El2‖x
i(t)− µi‖2‖x(t)− µ‖2
σ4t
= k0 Pr{x(t) ∈ RNd \A}, for some k0 > 0, (22)
where the inequality is due to Assumption (5) implying
|Ji(x(t)) − Ji(a(t))|2 ≤ l2‖x(t) − a(t)‖2, and furthermore
because ‖x(t)−a(t)‖2 ≤ ‖x(t)−µ‖2 for a(t) = ProjAx(t).
Next, let us estimate Pr{x(t) ∈ RNd \ A}. The idea is
that due to the fact that x(t) is sampled from a Gaussian
distribution with mean µ(t), x(t) concentrates around its mean
µ(t) with high probability. Since the mean is projected onto
a shrunk version of the set A, namely, (1 − rt)A, by appro-
priately tuning rt and σt we can ensure that x(t) stays within
the original feasible set with high probability. Let Ort(µ) =
{y ∈ RNd|‖y − µ‖2 < r2t } denote the rt-neighborhood of
the point µ. Hence, supy/∈Ort (µ)−‖y − µ‖2 = −r2t . Then,
taking into account the fact that Ort(µ) is contained in A and
rt < 1, we obtain that for any t and any bounded σ > σt:
Pr{x(t) ∈ RNd \A} ≤ Pr{x(t) ∈ RNd \ Ort(µ)}
=
∫
y/∈Ort(µ)
1
(2π)Nd/2σNdt
exp
{
−‖y − µ‖
2
2σ2t
}
dy
=
∫
y/∈Ort(µ)
exp
{
−‖y − µ‖2
(
1
2σ2t
− 1
2σ2
)}
× σ
Nd
σNdt
1
(2π)Nd/2σNd
exp
{
−‖y − µ‖
2
2σ2
}
dy
≤ exp
{
−rt
(
1
2σ2t
− 1
2σ2
)}
σNd
σNdt
×
∫
y/∈Ort(µ)
1
(2π)Nd/2σNd
exp
{
−‖y − µ‖
2
2σ2
}
dy
≤ k2 e
−
r
2
t
2σ2
t
σNdt
(23)
for some finite k2 > 0. The last inequality holds because∫
y/∈Ort (µ)
1
(2π)Nd/2σNd
exp
{
−‖y − µ‖
2
2σ2
}
dy ≤ 1
and, thus, there exists 0 < k3 <∞:∫
y/∈Ort (µ)
e
r
2
t
2σ2 σn
(2π)n/2σNd
exp
{
−‖y − µ‖
2
2σ2
}
dy ≤ k3.
From (16) it now remains to bound the term
E{(Ri(x(t),µ(t)),P i(x(t),µ(t)))|µ(t) = µ}.
According to definitions of P i and Ri, Remark 1, and the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
E{(Ri(x(t),µ(t)),P i(x(t),µ(t)))|µ(t) = µ} (24)
= E(Ji(x(t))
xi(t)− µi
σ2t
− M˜ i(µ, σt),
xi(t)− µi
σ2t
(Ji(a(t))− Ji(x(t))))
≤ ‖M˜ i(µ, σt)‖E‖Pi(xt,µ)‖
− E
{
Ji(x(t))(Ji(a(t)) − Ji(x(t)))‖xi(t)− µi‖2
σ4t
}
≤ ‖M˜ i(µ, σt)‖E‖Pi(xt,µ)‖
+ Pr{x(t) ∈ RNd \A}×
× E
{ |Ji(x(t))|‖x(t) − µ‖‖xi(t)− µi‖2
σ4t
}
.
Note that ‖M˜ i(µ, σt)‖ is bounded from Lemma 2), and that
E
{ |Ji(x(t))|‖x(t) − µ‖‖xi(t)− µi‖2
σ4t
}
=
hi(µ, σt)
σ4t
,
(25)
where hi(µ, σt) is a quadratic function of µ and σt, i ∈ [N ]
(see Appendix E for more details). Hence, due to the choice
of the parameters rt and σt (in particular, Assumption 6 d))
and the estimations in (22)- (24), we conclude that the terms
containing P i are dominated by other terms in the inequality
in (16). Thus, by inserting (17)-(21) into (16), we obtain
E{‖µi(t+ 1)− zi(t+ 1)‖2|µ(t) = µ}
≤ (1− 2βtǫt)‖µi − zi(t+ 1)‖2
− 2βt(M i(µ)−M i(z(t)),µi − zi(t))
+ 2βtO(σt)(1 + V (t,µ))
+β2t ǫ
2(t)V (t,µ)
+O(γ2t )(1 + V (t,µ)), (26)
where in the last inequality we used the fact that ǫt → 0
(Assumption 6 a)), γt → 0, and σt → 0 for all i ∈ [N ]
as t → ∞ (Assumption 6 c), d)). Thus, taking into account
Assumption 6 c), d) and (26), we obtain
E[‖µ(t+ 1)− z(t+ 1)‖2|µ(t) = µ]
8=
N∑
i=1
E[‖µi(t+ 1)− zi(t+ 1)‖2|µ(t) = µ]
≤(1− 2ǫtβt)‖µ− z(t)‖2 − 2βt(M (µ)−M(z(t)),µ − z(t))
+O(βtσt + γ
2
t )(1 + V (t,µ)). (27)
Thus,
LV (t,µ) ≤− 2βt(M (µ)−M(z(t)),µ − z(t))
+O(βtσt + γ
2
t )(1 + V (t,µ)). (28)
According to Assumption 6 b)-c),
∑∞
t=0 βtσt + γ
2
t < ∞.
Furthermore, from Assumption 6 a)
∑∞
t=0 βt = ∞. Taking
into account this, (28), and monotonicity of M implying
(M(µ)−M (z(t)),µ− z(t)) ≥ 0, ∀t, ∀µ ∈ A, (29)
we conclude that LV (t,µ) satisfies the decay needed for the
application of Theorem 2.5.2 in [15] and consequently, µ(t)
is finite almost surely for any t ∈ Z+ irrespective of µ(0).
D. Convergence to Nash equilibrium
We will use the bound estimations in the previous section
to prove convergence of the algorithm. In particular, we use
Inequality (27), which bounds the decay of the sequence
E[‖µ(t+ 1)− z(t)‖2|µ(t)] in terms of ‖µ− z(t+ 1)‖2. We
will show that this decay satisfies the conditions for applying
Lemma 10 in [17]. From this, it can readily be inferred that
random variables ‖µ(t)− z(t)‖ converge to zero.
First, however, let us verify that even in the compact action
case, Inequalities (27), (28) hold.
Remark 2: If the set A is compact, due to Assumption 5,
the inequality (21) can be replaced by
E{‖Ri(x(t),µ(t))‖2|µ(t) = µ} = O
(
1
σ4t
)
.
Moreover, the inequalities (22) and (24) hold
for the case of the bounded set A. Indeed, due
to polynomial behavior of Ji(x(t)) for large
x(t), the terms E ‖x
i(t)−µi‖2|Ji(x(t))−Ji(a(t))|
2
σ4
t
and
E
{
|Ji(x(t))(Ji(a(t))−Ji(x(t)))|‖x
i(t)−µi‖2
σ4
t
}
are upper bounded
by some constants. Thus, for the bounded set A, the inequality
(27) can be rewritten as
E[‖µ(t+ 1)− z(t+ 1)‖2|µ(t) = µ]
≤(1− 2ǫtβt)‖µ− z(t)‖2 − 2βt(M (µ)−M(z(t)),µ − z(t))
+O(βtσt + γ
2
t ).
Proof: (of Theorem 2) Note that we can rewrite (27) as:
E[‖µ(t+ 1)− z(t+ 1)‖2|Ft]
≤(1 − 2ǫtβt)‖µ(t)− z(t)‖2 +O(γ2t + βtσt), (30)
where Ft is the σ-algebra generated by the random variables
{x(k),µ(k)}tk=0. In (30) we used (29) and Lemma 5.
From Assumption 6, and the choices of γt, σt, ǫt, we get
O(γ2t +βtσt) = O(
1
tn ), ǫtβt =
1
tm , with n > 1, m ≤ 1. Thus,
lim
t→∞
O(γ2t + βtσt)
ǫtβt
= 0.
Assumption 6 d), the fact that
∑∞
t=0 γ
2
t + βtσt <∞ and the
above result in the decay (30) imply that we can apply Lemma
10 in [17] to the sequence ‖µ(t+1)− z(t+1)‖2 to conclude
its almost sure convergence to 0 as t → ∞. Next, by taking
into account Theorem 3 and Theorem 1, we obtain that
Pr{ lim
t→∞
µ(t) = a∗} = 1,
where a∗ is the least norm Nash equilibrium in the
game Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji}). Finally, Assumption 6 implies that
limt→∞ σt = 0. Taking into account that x(t) ∼ N(µ(t), σt)
and limt→∞ ‖a(t) − x(t)‖ = 0, we conclude that a(t)
converges weakly to a Nash equilibrium a∗ = µ∗. Moreover,
according to Portmanteau Lemma [10], this convergence is
also in probability.
V. DISCUSSION
In the proposed algorithm convergence is established under
mild conditions as strict monotonicity of the game mapping
is not implied. This significantly extends the applicability
of bandit online learning. For example, the zero-sum game
considered in [13] with an interior Nash equilibrium satisfies
the assumption of our theorem. Whereas all the follow-the-
regularized leader (FTRL) learning approach fails to converge
in a simple zero-sum game (such as matching penny), our
doubly regularized approach can resolve this problem. In
general, examples of games that satisfy assumptions above in-
clude mixed extensions of zero-sum games, Cournot competi-
tion, continuous-action congestion games and convex potential
games. On the other hand, mixed extensions of non-zero sum
games do not satisfy the monotonicity assumption in general.
In accordance with the payoff-based information structure,
the parameters γt, σt, ǫt, rt are independent of the problem
data including the Lipschitz constant of the game mapping or
the constraint sets. Below, we further specify feasible choices
of the parameters to ensure convergence.
Lemma 6: A sufficient condition on 0 < a1, a2, a3, a4 < 1
for satisfying Assumption 6 is as follows:
i) a1 + 2a2 < 1, a1 + 2a2 + a3 < 1.
ii) a1 + 2a2 + a3 < 1, a1 + 2a2 + 6a3 − 2a4 < 1.
iii) 2a1 > 1, a1 + 3a2 > 1.
iv) a3 < a4 < a2.
Proof: The series
∑∞
t=0 1/t
m converges for m > 1 and
diverges otherwise. Thus, the statements i), iii), iv) above fol-
low. To show statement ii), let us consider the term (ǫt−ǫt−1)2
in the first summand of b), namely,
∑∞
t=0
(ǫt−ǫt−1)
2
βtǫ3t
:
(ǫt − ǫt−1)2 = (t−a3 − (t− 1)−a3)2 (multiply by t
2a3
t2a3
)
=
(
(1 − 1/t)−a3 − 1)2/t2a3 (do Taylor approximation)
= (1 + a3/t+O(t
−2)− 1)2/t2a3 = O(t−2−2a3 ).
Combining the above with the denominator βtǫ
3
t , we obtain
that
∑
t
(ǫt−ǫt−1)
2
βtǫ3t
converges if a31+2a2+a3 < 1. Repeating
the same analysis for
(rt−rt−1)
2
βtǫ6t
, we obtain
∑
t
(rt−rt−1)
2
βtǫ6t
converges if a1 + 2a2 + 6a3 − 2a4 < 1 and ii) is verified.
9VI. CONCLUSIONS
We designed an algorithm for learning Nash equilibria in
convex games with monotone game mappings using online
bandit feedback information. Our algorithm relied on a suitable
double regularization to handle non-strictly monotone game
maps as well as feasibility of the queried actions (online
setting). The implications of our result is that players can
learn Nash equilibria in several monotone games such as
finite action zero-sum games, infinite action zero-sum convex
games and convex games with linear coupling constraints.
Several points remain open and are topic of our current
study. These include showing that our algorithm is no-regret,
unifying different sampling approaches to perform one-point
estimation of the game mapping for bandit learning in games,
and analyzing the convergence rate of the algorithm.
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APPENDIX
The appendix provides supporting theorems and proof of
certain lemmas and statements.
A. Supporting Theorems
Let {X(t)}t, t ∈ Z+, be a discrete-time Markov process on
some state space E ⊆ Rd, namely X(t) = X(t, ω) : Z+ ×
Ω→ E, where Ω is the sample space of the probability space
on which the process X(t) is defined. The transition function
of this chain, namely Pr{X(t+1) ∈ Γ|X(t) = X}, is denoted
by P (t,X, t+ 1,Γ), Γ ⊆ E.
Definition 4: The operator L defined on the set of measur-
able functions V : Z+ × E → R, X ∈ E, by
LV (t,X) =
∫
P (t,X, t+ 1, dy)[V (t+ 1, y)− V (t,X)]
= E[V (t+ 1,X(t+ 1)) | X(t) = X]− V (t,X),
is called a generating operator of a Markov process {X(t)}t.
Next, we formulate the following theorem for discrete-time
Markov processes, which is proven in [15], Theorem 2.5.2.
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Theorem 4: Consider a Markov process {X(t)}t and sup-
pose that there exists a function V (t,X) ≥ 0 such that
inft≥0 V (t,X)→∞ as ‖X‖ → ∞ and
LV (t,X) ≤ −α(t+ 1)ψ(t,X) + f(t)(1 + V (t,X)),
where ψ ≥ 0 on R×Rd, f(t) > 0,∑∞t=0 f(t) <∞. Let α(t)
be such that α(t) > 0,
∑∞
t=0 α(t) = ∞. Then, almost surely
supt≥0 ‖X(t, ω)‖ = R(ω) <∞.
The following result related to the convergence of the
stochastic process is proven in Lemma 10 (page 49) in [17].
Theorem 5: Let v0, . . . , vk be a sequence of random vari-
ables, vk ≥ 0, Ev0 <∞ and let
E{vk+1|Fk} ≤ (1− αk)vk + βk,
where Fk is the σ-algebra generated by the random variables
{v0, . . . , vk}, 0 < αk < 1,
∑∞
k=0 αk = ∞, βk ≥ 0,∑∞
k=0 βk <∞, limk→∞ βkαk = 0. Then vk → 0 almost surely,
Evk → 0 as k→∞.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof:We verify that the differentiation under the integral
sign in (4) is justified. It can then readily be verified that
(6) holds, by taking the differentiation inside the integral. A
sufficient condition for differentiation under the integral is
that the integral of the formally differentiated function with
respect to µik converges uniformly, whereas the differentiated
function is continuous (see [21], Chapter 17). By formally
differentiating the function under the integral sign and omitting
the arguments t, we obtain
1
σ2
∫
RNd
Ji(x)(x
i
k − µik)p(µ,x, σ)dx. (31)
Given Assumption 1, Ji(x)(x
i
k−µik)p(µ,x, σ) is continuous.
Thus, it remains to check that the integral of this function
converges uniformly with respect to any µ ∈ A. If A is
bounded, then the conclusion follows from the polynomial
behavior of the function Ji on the infinity.
Now, we move to the case of the unbounded set A. To
this end, we can write the Taylor expansion of the function
Ji around the point µ(i, k) ∈ RNd with the coordinates
µ(i, k)ik = µ
i
k and µ(i, k)
j
m = x
j
m for any j 6= i, m 6= k,
in the integral (31):∫
RNd
Ji(x)(x
i
k − µik)p(µ,x, σ)dx
=
∫
RNd
[Ji(µ(i, k))
+
∂Ji(η(x,µ))
∂xik
(xik − µik)](xik − µik)p(µ,x, σ)dx
=
∫
RNd
∂Ji(η(x,µ))
∂xik
(xik − µik)2p(µ,x, σ)dx
=
∫
RNd
∂Ji(η1(y,µ))
∂xik
(yik)
2p(0,y, σ)dy,
where η(x,µ) = µ(i, k) + θ(x − µ(i, k)), θ ∈ (0, 1),
y = x − µ(i, k), η1(y,µ) = µ(i, k) + θy. The uniform
convergence of the integral above and, in particular, its
boundedness, follows from the fact3 that under Assumption 5,
3see the basic sufficient condition using majorant [21], Chapter 17.2.3.
∂Ji(η1(y,µ))
∂xi
k
≤ lik for some positive constant lik and for all
i ∈ [N ] and k ∈ [d]. Thus, |∂Ji(η1(y,µ))
∂xi
k
(yik)
2p(0,y, σ)| ≤
h(y) = l(yik)
2p(0,y, σ),where
∫
RNd
h(y)dy <∞.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume x /∈ (1 −
rt−1)A (otherwise, ‖Proj(1−rt−1)Ax − Proj(1−rt)Ax‖ = 0).
Due to convexity of the set A ⊂ RNd there exists a convex
function g : RNd → R such that A = {x : g(x) ≤ 0},
whereas (1 − rt)A = {x : g(x) ≤ −rt} for any t. Moreover,
since Proj(1−rt−1)Ax = Proj(1−rt−1)A{Proj(1−rt)Ax}, we
have ‖Proj(1−rt−1)Ax− Proj(1−rt)Ax‖ = d, where
d = min
y
‖y− x′‖, x′ = Proj(1−rt)Ax,
s.t. g(y) = −rt−1.
The optimization problem has a solution y∗ for which the
gradient of the corresponding Lagrangian is zero, namely
(y∗ − x′)
‖y∗ − x′‖ + λ∇g(y
∗) = 0,
where λ > 0 is the dual multiplier of the problem under
consideration. Notice that due to Assumption 1 and the choice
of r1 the Slator’s condition for the constraints g(x) ≤ −rt
holds for all t. Hence, for any x ∈ RNd there exists a constant
Λ > 0 such that λ < Λ (see [8]). Thus, we conclude that
∇g(y∗) = − (y
∗ − x′)
λ‖y∗ − x′‖ .
Next, due to convexity of the function g,
g(x′) ≥ g(y∗) + (∇g(y∗),x′ − y∗)
= −rt−1 + ‖y
∗ − x′‖2
λ|y∗ − x′‖ ≥ −rt−1 +
‖y∗ − x′‖
Λ
.
Thus, taking into account that g(x′) ≤ −rt, we obtain
d = ‖y∗ − x′‖ ≤ Λ(rt−1 − rt) = O(|rt−1 − rt|).
D. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: Let us use θ = ǫ
3/2
t in Lemma 1 to express y(t)
as y(t) = Proj(1−rt)A[y(t)− ǫ
3/2
t (M (y(t))+ ǫty(t))]. Using
this equivalence, the triangle inequality and non-expansion of
projection operator we obtain
‖y(t)− y(t− 1)‖
≤ ‖Proj(1−rt)A[y(t)− ǫ
3/2
t (M (y(t)) + ǫty(t))]
− Proj(1−rt)A[y(t− 1)− ǫ
3/2
t (M(y(t− 1))
+ ǫt−1y(t− 1))]‖+ ‖Proj(1−rt)A[y(t− 1)
− ǫ3/2t (M (y(t− 1)) + ǫt−1y(t− 1))]
− Proj(1−rt−1)A[y(t− 1)−
ǫ
3/2
t (M(y(t− 1)) + ǫt−1y(t− 1))]‖
≤ ‖(1− ǫ3/2t ǫt)(y(t)− y(t− 1))
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− ǫ3/2t (M (y(t)) −M(y(t− 1)))
+ y(t− 1)ǫ3/2t (ǫt−1 − ǫt)‖
+ ‖Proj(1−rt)A[y˜(t− 1)]− Proj(1−rt−1)A[y˜(t− 1)]‖,
where y˜(t−1) = y(t−1)−ǫ3/2t (M (y(t−1))+ǫt−1y(t−1)).
Next, due to Lemma 3 we have for any θt > 0 and κt > 0
‖y(t)− y(t− 1)‖2 ≤ (1 + θt)‖(1− ǫ3/2t ǫt)(y(t)− y(t− 1))
− ǫ3/2t (M (y(t))−M (y(t− 1)))
+ y(t− 1)ǫ3/2t (ǫt−1 − ǫt)‖2 + (1 + 1/θt)O((rt − rt−1)2)
≤ (1 + θt)(1 + κt)‖(1− ǫ3/2t ǫt)(y(t)− y(t− 1))
− ǫ3/2t (M (y(t))−M (y(t− 1)))‖2
+ (1 + 1/κt)‖y(t− 1)‖2ǫ3t (ǫt−1 − ǫt)2
+ (1 + 1/θt)O((rt − rt−1)2).
Furthermore, there exists T such that for all t > T
‖(1− ǫ3/2t ǫt)(y(t)− y(t− 1))
− ǫ3/2t (M(y(t))−M(y(t− 1)))‖2
≤ (1− ǫ3/2t ǫt)2‖y(t)− y(t− 1)‖2
+ ǫ3t‖M(y(t))−M(y(t− 1))‖2
≤ (1− 2ǫ3/2t ǫt + ǫ3t (ǫ2t + L2))‖y(t)− y(t− 1)‖2
≤ (1− ǫ3/2t ǫt)‖y(t)− y(t− 1)‖2,
where the first inequality is due to monotonicity of the
mapping M , the second one is as it is Lipschitz continuous,
and the third one is due to the fact that ǫ3t (ǫ
2
t+L
2) ≤ ǫ3/2t ǫt for
sufficiently large t (since ǫt → 0, see Assumption 6). Thus,
‖y(t)− y(t− 1)‖2 ≤ (1 + θt)(1 + κt)(1 − ǫ3/2t ǫt)×
‖y(t)− y(t− 1)‖2 + (1 + 1/κt)M2yǫ3t (ǫt−1 − ǫt)2
+ (1 + 1/θt)O((rt − rt−1)2),
where M2y is the uniform upper bound of the norm of the
sequence y(t). By rearranging the terms above, we obtain
(1− (1 + θt)(1 + κt)(1 − ǫ3/2t ǫt))‖y(t)− y(t− 1)‖2
≤ (1 + 1/κt)M2yǫ3t (ǫt−1 − ǫt)2
+ (1 + 1/θt)O((rt − rt−1)2).
We conclude the proof by noticing that, according to the choice
of ǫ
3/2
t and ǫt and by taking κt = θt =
1
4ǫ
3/2
t ǫt, we obtain,
(1− (1 + θt)(1 + κt)(1− ǫ3/2t ǫt)) ≥ ǫ3/2t ǫt − θt − κt − θtκt
≥ 0.4ǫ3/2t ǫt.
E. Verification of Equations (21) and (25)
Due to Assumption 5 there exists a compact set S ⊂ RNd
such that for any x /∈ S
Ji(x) ≤ (c,x) + b0
for some c = (c11, . . . , c
1
d, . . . , c
N
1 , . . . , c
N
d ) ∈ RNd and b0 ∈
R. Thus, for some positive S, d1 and d2 we get∫
RNd
Ji
2(x)
(xik − µik)2
σ4t
p(µ,x)dx
≤
∫
S
Ji
2(x)
(xik − µik)2
σ4t
p(µ,x)dx
+
∫
RNd\S
[d1‖x‖2 + d2] (x
i
k − µik)2
σ4t
p(µ,x)dx
≤ S
σ4t
+
∫
RNd
[d1‖x‖2 + d2] (x
i
k − µik)2
σ4t
p(µ,x)dx
=
S
σ4t
+
fi(µ, σt)
σ4t
,
fi(µ, σt) being a quadratic function of µ and σt. The last
equality is due to the fact that∫
RNd
(xik − µik)2p(µ,x)dx = σ2t ,∫
RNd
(xik)
2(xik − µik)2p(µ,x)dx
≤
∫
RNd
[2(xik − µik)2 + (µik)2)](xik − µik)2p(µ,x)dx
= 2σ4t + (µ
i
k)
2)σ2t ,∫
RNd
(xjm)
2(xik − µik)2p(µ,x)dx
= (σ2t + (µ
j
m)
2)σ2t |.
Analogously one obtains the estimation (25).
